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Both humans and some non-human animals tend to respond more vigorously after failing 
to obtain rewards. Such response invigoration becomes more pronounced when 
individuals have increased expectations of obtaining rewards during reward pursuit 
(expectancy), and when they perceive the eventual loss to be proximal to reward receipt 
(proximity). However, it was unclear whether proximity and expectancy may have distinct 
influences on response vigor. To investigate this question, we developed a computerized 
’scratch card’ task, in which participants turned three cards one by one and won points 
when all three cards matched (AAA). After each game, they pressed keys to confirm the 
outcome and start a new game. We included three types of losses: AAB, where 
participants had increased expectancy of winning as the game evolved, and the final 
outcome was proximal to winning; ABB and ABA, with reduced expectancy, but high 
proximity to winning; and ABC, with reduced expectancy and low proximity to winning. 
In three online studies, we consistently observed that participants confirmed losses more 
quickly than wins. Importantly, detailed analyses of the different types of losses revealed 
that proximity reduced vigor, whereas expectancy increased it. Together, these findings 
are in line with general appraisal theories: the adjustments of response vigor may be 
triggered by the appraised discrepancy between the current state and a reference state 
(e.g., attaining one’s goal), and serve to close the gap and facilitate goal pursuit. These 
findings may also have implications for the effect of ‘near miss’ on gambling persistence. 
Further exploring how reward omission impacts response vigor may help us better 
understand the goal pursuit process, and how it becomes maladaptive under certain 
circumstances. 
Introduction 
Action is motivated, as both humans and non-human an-
imals generally seek to maximize reward (while also mini-
mize punishment). However, they do not always succeed in 
obtaining rewards. For humans, incidents of such failures 
may range from mundane situations, such as running and 
missing the train, to more important ones, such as passing 
all selections yet not getting the job. When a desired reward 
is not obtained, how do individuals respond? In the current 
research, we focus on this important albeit often overlooked 
aspect of reward-seeking behavior. 
Previous studies suggest that after failing to obtain a 
reward, humans and (at least some) non-human animals 
often increase the vigor of ensuing responses (response 
speed, force, or frequency). In a seminal study by Amsel & 
Roussel (1952), hungry rats were trained to run through two 
runways to obtain food pellets at the end of each runway. 
When the food pellets at the end of the first runway were 
removed, rats ran through the second runway more quickly, 
suggesting that reward omission (at least initially) invigo-
rated responses (see also Dudley & Papini, 1997). Response 
invigoration after reward omission has also been observed 
in humans. For instance, when human participants were 
blocked from obtaining a monetary reward, they pressed a 
button with more force to confirm the outcome (Yu et al., 
2014). Similarly, in a gambling context, participants initiat-
ed the next trial more quickly after a loss (i.e., reward omis-
sion) than after a win and a non-gamble baseline (Eben et 
al., 2020; Verbruggen et al., 2017; see also Corr & Thomp-
son, 2014; M. J. Dixon et al., 2013; Stange et al., 2016). In 
the present study, we examined if the nature of the reward 
omission or loss matters for response invigoration. 
It has been argued that response invigoration after re-
ward omission is associated with certain negative emotions, 
such as disappointment, frustration, or regret (e.g., Ver-
bruggen et al., 2017; Yu et al., 2014). Appraisal theories of 
emotion provide a useful framework for understanding both 
response invigoration and the associated negative emotions 
after reward omission. According to appraisal theories of 
emotion, emotions are multicomponential processes that 
involve changes in various components, such as appraisal 
of an event, motivational action tendencies, physiological 
reactions, expressive behaviors (facial, vocal and gestural) 
and subjective feelings (Moors et al., 2013). Appraisal refers 
to the process of assessing and evaluating aspects of an 
event that are of significance to one’s well-being (Moors et 
al., 2013). The most central appraisal is whether an event 
is promoting or obstructing one’s goal(s). Failing to obtain 
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rewards can thus be appraised as a goal-incongruent event, 
which can lead to certain action tendencies, such as re-en-
gaging and attempting to obtain rewards again (other ac-
tion tendencies are also possible, such as discarding current 
reward pursuit, but here we will focus on re-engaging af-
ter reward omission). According to Frijda et al. (2014), these 
action tendencies, or states of action readiness, form the 
key to what we call “emotions”. Action tendencies can man-
ifest in actions with a certain strength and urgency (i.e., 
response vigor). Actions are considered “impulsive” when 
they are triggered by appraisals and not preceded by (much) 
deliberation. The strength or urgency of an (impulsive) ac-
tion depends on the appraised importance of a goal and 
the discrepancy between the current state and the desired 
state (Frijda, 2010). An action becomes more vigorous when 
a goal is perceived to be more important, and/or when the 
appraised discrepancy between the current and the desired 
state becomes larger. Since failing to obtain rewards of-
ten entails a larger discrepancy than obtaining rewards, re-
sponse thus becomes more vigorous after reward omission. 
In addition to changes in response vigor, changes in physi-
ological responses (e.g., increase in corticosteroid level, Pa-
pini & Dudley, 1997; and potential increase in skin con-
ductance response, Otis & Ley, 1993; but see Lole et al., 
2012) and expressive behaviors (e.g., frowning after losing 
in gambling; Wu et al., 2015) can also occur after reward 
omission. The integrated and synchronized changes in all 
components may lead to specific subjective feelings that 
can be categorized and verbalized, giving rise to discrete 
emotions such as ‘frustration’, ‘disappointment’, or ‘regret’ 
as its end product (Scherer & Moors, 2019). 
Appraisal theories assume that the appraisal of an event, 
rather than the event itself, determines the nature of the 
emotion or action triggered by an event (Frijda et al., 2014; 
Scherer & Moors, 2019; Siemer et al., 2007). Objectively the 
same event (e.g., failing to obtain a reward) may thus trigger 
different (intensities of) behavioral responses (and hence, 
emotions), depending on one’s appraisals. For instance, in 
the famous missed flight example by Kahneman & Tversky 
(1982), a traveler who missed his flight by 5 minutes is ex-
pected to feel worse than another traveler who missed the 
same flight by 30 minutes. Despite that the actual outcomes 
are the same, the appraisal of being proximal to the de-
sired state (i.e., catching the flight) by the first traveler may 
trigger an upward counterfactual thinking and intensify his 
negative emotions. Another notable example of objectively 
the same outcome triggering different behavioral responses 
is ‘near misses’ in some real-life gambling scenarios, such 
as electronic gambling machines and instant scratch cards. 
‘Near misses’ are losses that come very close to wins (Reid, 
1986). For instance, on a three-reel slot machine, the jack-
pot symbol falling on the pay line on the first two reels 
and just missing the pay line on the third one is a classic 
‘near miss’. Although objectively the same with other types 
of losses in terms of actual outcome, a classic ‘near miss’ 
seems especially potent in encouraging persistent gambling 
(Clark et al., 2009; Cote et al., 2003; Kassinove & Schare, 
2001; MacLin et al., 2007; Reid, 1986; Strickland & Grote, 
1967). Furthermore, players with gambling disorder show 
amplified responses in the striatum (a core region of the 
brain reward circuitry) to ‘near misses’ compared with play-
ers without gambling disorder (Chase & Clark, 2010; Habib 
& Dixon, 2010; Sescousse et al., 2016). The latter finding 
suggests ‘near misses’ might contribute to gambling disor-
der, although the causal relationship between gambling dis-
order and reactivity to ‘near misses’ remains unclear. 
Two unique cognitive processes may be triggered by the 
unfolding events in a ‘near miss’, which may distinguish it 
from other types of losses. Take again a three-reel slot ma-
chine as an example. Players may start a game with a cer-
tain expectation of winning. This initial expectation may be 
influenced by the outcomes of previous games, their over-
all optimism, experience with gambling, etc. After starting 
a game, their expectation of winning would presumably in-
crease after seeing the jackpot symbols on the first two 
reels. When the third reel eventually stops with no jackpot 
symbol (creating a ‘near miss’), the loss may be more unex-
pected compared to a ‘full miss’ (where the first or second 
reel already shows no jackpot symbol). In addition to an 
increased expectation of winning as the game evolves, a 
‘near miss’ is also subjectively closer to a win compared to 
a ‘full miss’ (although objectively a ‘near miss’ is as prox-
imal to a win as any other types of losses, M. R. Dixon & 
Schreiber, 2004), as it contains more jackpot symbols than a 
‘full miss’. Bossuyt et al. (2014) distinguished between these 
two processes, and referred to them as the appraisals of ‘ex-
pectancy’ and ‘proximity’, respectively. We will adopt this 
terminology in the present research for the sake of con-
sistency. Expectancy and proximity thus describe how the 
players appraise the unfolding events at different stages as 
a game evolves. Expectancy refers to whether the players’ 
expectations of winning increase from the beginning of a 
game to the moment before the outcome is revealed, where-
as proximity refers to whether the players subjectively per-
ceive a loss to be proximal to a win, after the eventual out-
come is revealed. Different outcomes may also influence the 
initial expectation of winning for the next game, but this is 
not what we (and Bossuyt et al.) studied here. 
A classic ‘near miss’ thus triggers an increased expecta-
tion of winning as the game evolves, and the final outcome 
is also subjectively proximal to a win. As noted by Bossuyt 
et al. (2014), the appraisals of expectancy and proximity 
are thus confounded in the case of a classic ‘near miss’. It 
is therefore unclear whether the effect of a ‘near miss’ on 
gambling persistence is due to one of the two processes, or 
both. Accordingly, gambling researchers have proposed dif-
ferent theoretical accounts for ‘near miss’ effects, empha-
sizing either the proximity of a ‘near miss’ to a win (see 
Clark, 2010; Clark et al., 2009; Reid, 1986 and Belisle & 
Dixon, 2016; Peters et al., 2010), or the increased expecta-
tion of winning (hence, the unexpected nature of the even-
tual loss) in a ‘near miss’ (M. J. Dixon et al., 2011, 2013; 
Sharman & Clark, 2016; Stange et al., 2016, 2017). Previ-
ous work examining how quickly gamblers initiate a new 
gamble after a ‘near miss’ (an indicator of response vig-
or) have also yielded inconsistent results (Belisle & Dixon, 
2016; Daly et al., 2014; M. J. Dixon et al., 2013; Stange et 
al., 2016, 2017; Worhunsky et al., 2014). This inconsistency 
may partly be caused by the confounding of proximity and 
expectancy in the operationalization of a ‘near miss’. 
To disentangle the influence of proximity and expectan-
cy on response vigor, we used a design similar to the one 
used by Bossuyt et al. (2014). These authors used a simu-
lated three-reel slot machine to independently manipulate 
proximity and expectancy. Participants won money when 
all three reels had the same symbol (e.g., three lemons, 
three prunes or three melons; AAA), and lost (i.e., no re-
ward) when any two symbols differed. Crucially, by chang-
ing the configuration of symbols on loss trials, proximity 
and expectancy were independently manipulated. The out-
come AAB (i.e., a classic ‘near miss’), where the last symbol 
differed from the first two, triggered appraisals of both in-
creased expectancy and high proximity. The outcomes ABB 
and ABA, while being equally proximal to a win as AAB 
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(i.e., all three outcomes have one symbol that is different 
from the other two), presumably reduced the expectation 
of winning as the game evolved, as the mismatch between 
the first and second reel already indicated that a win was 
no longer possible. The outcome ABC, where all three sym-
bols differed, led to reduced expectancy of winning during 
the game, and the final outcome was also distal to a win 
compared with other outcomes (i.e., reduced expectancy, 
low proximity). By comparing the different loss outcomes, 
Bossuyt et al. (2014) showed that proximity and expectancy 
had separate influences on negative emotions. Participants 
reported more disappointment, frustration and regret when 
they lost after having increased compared to reduced ex-
pectancy of winning (while controlling for proximity; AAB 
vs. ABA and ABB). In contrast, proximity did not affect 
these negative emotions (while controlling for expectancy; 
ABC vs. ABA and ABB). Instead, participants even rated the 
situation to be more positive after a proximal loss (ABA and 
ABB) compared with a distal loss (ABC). In addition to mea-
suring the ‘subjective feeling’ component, Bossuyt et al. 
(2014) also measured the motivational component, by mea-
suring participants’ tendency to repair after a loss. That is, 
participants could choose to bet in a new gamble to recoup 
their loss. Both high proximity and increased expectancy 
led to a higher tendency to repair. 
Proximity and expectancy thus have distinct influences 
on self-reported negative emotions triggered by goal-in-
congruent events. In the context of reward omission (which 
we consider to be a goal-incongruent event), this might im-
ply that they also modulate response vigor. Corroborating 
this idea, Amsel & Ward (1954) noted that rats only showed 
response invigoration by non-reward after some minimal 
number of rewards, suggesting that an ‘expectancy’ con-
struct may need to be developed before reward omission 
becomes ‘frustrative’ (see also Penney, 1960). In another 
study, Haner & Brown (1955) blocked children’s progress 
in a ‘marble’ game at different stages, and found that chil-
dren exerted more force when the blocking was introduced 
near rather than far away from the completion of the game. 
Similarly, adult participants pressed a button with more 
force after being blocked from a monetary reward, especial-
ly when the blocking occurred close to attaining the reward 
(Yu et al., 2014). The latter two findings could be interpret-
ed in terms of ‘proximity’ (i.e., more invigoration when the 
non-obtained reward was close). However, in these studies, 
proximity and expectancy were again ‘confounded’ as par-
ticipants were blocked at a moment where they were getting 
close to a reward (i.e., high proximity) and presumably al-
so had increased expectation of acquiring the reward (i.e., 
increased expectancy). Therefore, it remains unclear how 
these two appraisals may modulate response vigor after re-
ward omission. 
The Current Research 
In the current research, we adopted the manipulation 
from Bossuyt et al. (2014) and explored the influences of 
proximity and expectancy on response vigor. Although re-
sponse vigor may be broadly included in the motivational 
component of emotion (which Bossuyt et al. assessed via 
the tendency to repair measurement), it likely captures a 
different aspect of behavior than the tendency to repair. 
When selecting an action, individuals need to choose both 
which discrete action to execute (e.g., whether to repair or 
not), and the vigor with which to execute the selected ac-
tion. Thus, actions have a ‘directional’ and an ‘activational’ 
component (Braver et al., 2014; Niv et al., 2006), which may 
have distinct computational and neural underpinnings (Niv 
et al., 2007). By focusing on response vigor (the activational 
component), our work thus complements the previous work 
(Bossuyt et al., 2014) and contributes to an understanding 
of how distinct appraisals may influence motivational ac-
tion tendencies after reward omission. 
We developed an online ‘scratch card’ game, and recruit-
ed participants from Prolific.co, an online crowd-working 
platform (Palan & Schitter, 2018). Participants turned three 
cards out of an array of eight cards one by one, by pressing 
three keys consecutively. We opted to use a ‘scratch card’ 
task rather than a simulated slot machine for a few reasons. 
First, pragmatically, a ‘scratch card’ task was easier to pro-
gram than the spinning reels in a simulated slot machine. 
Second, by using a ‘scratch card’ task, we were able to ex-
plore whether the response time of turning each card in 
a game was influenced by the cards turned thus far. Al-
though this is also possible with slot machines (e.g., press 
a button to start the spin of a reel one by one), it would be 
less ecologically valid. Furthermore, instant scratch cards 
share many structure characteristics with slot machines (in-
cluding ‘near misses’), which led some researchers to pro-
pose that “scratch cards are essentially slot machines on pa-
per” (Ariyabuddhiphongs, 2011). While the structural char-
acteristics of slot machines and their potential influences 
on gambling have been extensively studied, our work adds 
to some recent work that extends this line of investigation 
to other forms of gambling, such as scratch card games 
(Stange et al., 2016, 2017). 
In our ‘scratch card’ game, participants won points when 
all three cards matched, and lost their wagers when any 
two (or three) cards differed. They then needed to press a 
key to confirm the outcome (Confirm RT), and press a key 
again to start the next trial (Start RT). We registered the re-
sponse time of each response as our dependent measure-
ments. To manipulate proximity and expectancy, following 
Bossuyt et al. (2014), we included different types of losses, 
namely AAB (increased expectancy, high proximity), ABB 
and ABA (reduced expectancy, high proximity), and ABC 
(reduced expectancy, low proximity). Furthermore, we var-
ied the amount of points at stake (in Experiment 1 and 
2) or the overall probability of winning (in Experiment 3) 
across trials, to explore their potential influence. Experi-
mental code and materials, raw data files and data analy-
sis scripts can be found at osf.io/vuy95/. For Experiment 1 
and 2, we did not seek to obtain formal ethics approval as 
these experiments were conducted according to the ethical 
rules presented in the General Ethical Protocol of the Fac-
ulty of Psychology and Educational Sciences of Ghent Uni-
versity. Experiment 3 was formally approved by the Ethical 
Committee (No. 2019/86). 
Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1, we used an online scratch card task 
that contained four different outcomes (AAA, AAB, ABB, or 
ABC) and two amounts of points participants could poten-
tially win (12 or 60 points). AAA was a win; AAB was a loss, 
but with increased expectancy and high proximity; ABB was 
a loss, with reduced expectancy but high proximity; and 
ABC was a loss with reduced expectancy and low proximi-
ty. Note that we used three cards with different fruits (or-
anges, strawberries, and grapes), and each card was ran-
domly assigned the role of A, B and C on each trial. AAA, 
AAB, ABB and ABC thus denoted the overall configurations 
rather than specific cards (i.e., AAA could be 3 oranges, 3 
strawberries, or 3 grapes). 
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Method 
We report how we determined our sample size, all data 
exclusions (if any), all manipulations, and all measures in 
the study (Simmons et al., 2012). 
Participants 
Participants who met the following criteria on Prolific.co 
were eligible for participation: (1) between 18 and 50 years 
old; (2) fluent in English; (3) having at least 70% of previ-
ously completed studies approved by researchers on Prolif-
ic.co (low approval rate may indicate low-effort responses); 
(4) not having participated in any previous studies hosted 
by the first author. According to Brysbaert (2019), typical ef-
fect sizes in psychological research are between Cohen’s 
= .4 and .3. Using  = .3 as the expected effect size, 90 par-
ticipants are needed to achieve 80% power with a two-sided 
paired-samples t test and an alpha level of .05 (G*Power 3.1; 
Faul et al., 2007). We therefore decided to recruit 100 par-
ticipants to leave some room for potential exclusion. In to-
tal, 104 participants 1 from Prolific.co took part in the ex-
periment (63 males, 40 females, 1 did not report gender; 
, ). All participants received 3 
pounds as compensation, plus another 3 pounds as extra 
bonus from the scratch card task (see below). 
Apparatus and materials 
The experiment was programmed in jsPsych (version 
6.0.5), an open-source JavaScript library for creating online 
behavioral experiments (de Leeuw, 2015). To participate in 
the experiment, participants needed to have a computer 
with a keyboard. The experiment only ran in Chrome and 
Firefox, as browsers other than these two may have compat-
ibility issues. 
Although the response times registered by jsPsych in 
Chrome and Firefox have a lag between 23 and 54 mil-
liseconds, the variability across trials is relatively small (the 
inter-trial standard deviation of response times caused by 
browser/operating system configurations varies between 
3.23 and 8.37 milliseconds, Bridges et al., 2020), and is com-
parable to other software widely used to register response 
times in the laboratory, such as the Psychophysics toolbox 
(de Leeuw & Motz, 2016) and E-Prime (Hilbig, 2016). Since 
we manipulated the factors of interest within participants, 
the potential lags in response times (introduced by different 
browsers, operating systems, devices and programs running 
in the background etc.) should be relatively constant across 
different conditions for each participant. The within-sub-
jects comparisons would therefore not be substantially in-
fluenced by the lags in response times. 
On each trial, eight cards were presented (blue or red; 
180  250 pixels) in a 3  3 grid, with no card presented 
in the center (see Figure 1 for the layout). Cards on the 
same row were separated by 40 pixels from each other, and 
rows were separated by 15 pixels vertically. When turned, 
each card contained a drawing of either a strawberry, some 
grapes or an orange (selected from Duñabeitia et al., 2018 
picture number 381, 620, and 695, respectively). The out-
come of a trial was predetermined (see below), so we used 
these three types of cards to create four outcomes with 
equal probabilities (25% for each outcome): AAA (all three 
cards contained the same fruit), AAB (the last card differed 
from the first two), ABB (the first card differed from the 
last two) and ABC (all three cards differed). Throughout the 
experiment, the amount of points in the balance was con-
stantly updated and presented under the card array (font 
size: 25 pixels). 
Procedure 
Participants were recruited via Prolific.co. They first re-
ceived an informed consent, which they needed to agree to 
in order to start the experiment. They were informed that 
they were going to play a series of ‘scratch card’ games, in 
which they would turn 3 cards one by one, and win points 
if all three cards matched. They were further informed that 
accumulated points would be converted into real money at 
the end of the experiment, with 100 points worth 50 British 
pence and a maximum of 3 pounds as extra bonus. 
Participants then started with the scratch card task (see 
Figure 1 for the trial procedure). Each trial started with a 
start screen, with the message ‘Press any number key to 
purchase the game (X points) and play to win Y points’ 
printed in the middle of the screen (font size: 30 pixels). 
Participants could press any of the 10 number keys (from 0 
till 9) to start a game. The points required to purchase the 
game were immediately subtracted from their balance when 
a key was pressed. We included two types of games with 
different payoffs (the four outcomes were equally probable 
within these two types of games). Half of the games cost 
2 (X) points per game, and participants could win 12 (Y) 
points (i.e., the low-amount condition). The other half of 
the games cost 10 (X) points per game, and participants 
could win 60 (Y) points (i.e., the high-amount condition). 
Cards with different colors (either red or blue) were used to 
indicate the amount of points participants could potentially 
win, and the assignment of color to each amount condition 
was randomized across participants. 
After a blank screen of 500 milliseconds, eight cards were 
presented on screen. A question mark was displayed in the 
center, to prompt participants to choose a card. Participants 
had to press a number key to select the corresponding card. 
The card was turned immediately after a response had been 
registered. 
After the first card was turned, the question mark in the 
center disappeared for 500 milliseconds, during which time 
participants could not turn the second card yet. When the 
question mark reappeared, participants could turn one of 
the remaining cards by pressing the corresponding num-
ber key again. This process repeated until participants had 
turned three cards. The 500-millisecond wait period was 
included after each response to prevent participants from 
pressing three keys simultaneously. These wait periods thus 
ensured that participants would have to turn three cards se-
Prolific.co sets a maximum duration for each experiment. Participants who do not finish within the maximum duration are ‘timed out’ 
and their slots are re-opened for new participants. Four participants took longer than the maximum duration (but nevertheless finished 
the experiment), thus resulting in 104 participants in total. In addition, three participants started the experiment but did not finish, and 
were ‘timed out’ (not included in the analysis); 13 participants initially reserved a slot but then withdrew; 1 participant was rejected as 
they could not provide a completion code, and there was also no data recorded. 
1 
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Figure 1: The trial procedure in the scratch card task 
quentially, which was crucial for manipulating expectancy. 
After all three cards had been turned and the outcome 
thus revealed (and an extra 500-millisecond wait period had 
passed), the amount of points participants had won on the 
current trial was displayed in the center, along with the 
three turned cards. For the low-amount condition, partici-
pants received 12 points if all three cards matched; for the 
high-amount condition, they received 60 points if all three 
cards matched. For the remaining outcomes, participants 
received 0 points. But as games had to be ‘purchased’ at the 
beginning of each trial - i.e., 2 points in the low-amount 
condition and 10 points in the high-amount condition – 
they actually lost points when the cards did not match. Note 
that the purchase requirement also implied that the net 
outcome on win trials was 10 or 50 points. The number of 
points (0, 12, or 60) was displayed in the center of the dis-
play, and participants needed to press any of the 10 num-
ber keys to confirm the outcome and end the current trial. 
The start screen of the next trial was then presented after a 
500-millisecond blank screen. 
Unbeknownst to the participants, the outcome of each 
game was predetermined (although the specific cards used 
on each trial were randomly generated). For instance, if a 
particular trial was assigned to the AAB condition, partic-
ipants would get this outcome regardless of which three 
cards they chose to turn. The specific cards that were actu-
ally turned were randomly generated (e.g., for an AAB tri-
al, it could be strawberry-strawberry-orange, or orange-or-
ange-grapes etc.). We used a 2 (amount: high vs. low) by 4 
(outcome: AAA, AAB, ABB vs. ABC) within-subject design, 
with each cell containing 30 trials. The whole task consisted 
of 240 trials. 
Throughout the experiment, the amount of points par-
ticipants had in their balance was constantly displayed at 
the bottom of the screen (not shown in Figure 1) and updat-
ed whenever they purchased a new game (i.e., at the start of 
a game) or won points (i.e., at the end of a game). Partici-
pants had 50 points at the start of the experiment. To en-
sure that the balance was never below 0, the order of trials 
was pseudo-randomized. First, in the first 8 games, partici-
pants experienced each condition once (i.e., 2 amount lev-
els  4 outcomes). Thus, by the end of the first 8 games, all 
participants had 74 points in their balance. Second, the re-
maining trials were randomized in such a way that the bal-
ance never fell below 0. By taking these two measures, we 
ensured that no participant would experience bankruptcy 
during the play. Since the outcomes of all trials were prede-
termined, all participants ended up with 770 points at the 
end of the experiment (equivalent to 3.85 pounds accord-
ing to the conversion rate). The overall expected value of a 
game was thus positive in Experiment 1, in that all partic-
ipants won 720 points in total. This differs from most re-
al-life gambling scenarios, in which the expected value of 
gambling is negative so that players lose money in the long 
run. All participants received the maximum extra bonus of 
3 pounds, in addition to the 3 pounds for compensation. 
After the scratch card task, participants filled out the 
short version of the UPPS-P impulsive behavior scale (Cy-
ders et al., 2014), as part of a larger (different) study that 
aims to explore individual differences in impulsivity. Data 
from the UPPS-P scale will not be discussed here (as we con-
sidered sample size too low to study individual differences 
here; see also Brysbaert, 2019). Participants were then de-
briefed, thanked, and compensated via Prolific.co. 
Data Analysis 
Data analyses and reporting were conducted in R (3.6.2; 
R Core Team, 2019), with the R packages afex (0.25-1; 
Singmann et al., 2019), BayesFactor (0.9.12-4.2; Morey & 
Rouder, 2018), tidyverse (1.3.0; Wickham et al., 2019), pa-
paja (0.1.0.9842; Aust & Barth, 2018), knitr (1.26; Xie, 2019) 
and kableExtra (1.1.0; Zhu, 2019). We also used JASP 
(0.11.1, JASP Team, 2019) to conduct Bayesian sequential 
analyses and robustness checks for Bayes factors. 
Data Cleaning 
Each single trial contains five responses: the response to 
start the current trial, the responses to turn the first, sec-
ond and third card, and the response to confirm the out-
come. We measured the latencies of all responses (from the 
end of the preceding wait period till the moment when a re-
sponse was made). But since we were interested in how vig-
or is modulated by unfolding events, a single ‘episode’ ac-
tually consisted of 8 responses: the start response of trial 
n, the responses required to turn the three cards on trial n, 
the confirmation response of trial n, the start response of 
trial n+1 (as in Verbruggen et al., 2017), and the respons-
es required to turn the first and second card on trial n+1. 
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Table 1: Repeated-Measures ANOVAs in Experiment 1 
Stage Effect F df1 df2 M S E p g e s 
Card3 
Outcome 35.73 1 101 35,033.19 < .001 .042 
Amount 3.86 1 101 7,910.50 .052 .001 
Outcome × Amount 1.70 1 101 4,400.71 .195 .000 
Confirm 
Outcome 74.88 1.58 159.17 104,592.05 < .001 .125 
Amount 2.40 1 101 14,033.19 .124 .000 
Outcome × Amount 6.32 2.91 293.95 13,019.14 < .001 .003 
Start 
Outcome 56.36 1.95 197.40 24,205.90 < .001 .045 
Amount 2.93 1 101 9,595.87 .090 .000 
Outcome × Amount 6.71 2.59 261.30 8,611.19 < .001 .003 
Note. ,  = degrees of freedom, decimal numbers are the Greenhouse-Geisser corrected dfs;  = mean-squared errors;  = generalized eta-squared. 
Note that after the second card has been turned, the out-
come of a game is partially revealed. We thus did not in-
clude the RT of turning the third card on trial n+1, as this 
RT may be influenced by both the outcome of trial n and the 
partial outcome of trial n+1, and we did not have enough 
trials to examine this interaction effect. Trials that were not 
immediately followed by other trials (i.e., the last trial, and 
a few other trials due to missing data) were first deleted. For 
the remaining episodes, we only included the ones where 
all eight RTs were below 5 seconds in the data analysis. This 
exclusion criterion was predetermined and consistent with 
previous studies (Eben et al., 2020; Verbruggen et al., 2017). 
By using this exclusion criterion, we excluded episodes in 
which participants might have taken a short break (hence 
resulting in RTs potentially longer than 5 seconds). 
After applying these exclusion criteria, the number of 
episodes left for each amount and outcome combination 
was counted for each participant. Each cell originally con-
tained 30 trials. To have a reliable estimation of RT, partici-
pants needed to have at least 15 episodes left in each cell in 
order to be included in the analyses. Based on this criterion, 
data from 2 participants were excluded, leaving 102 partic-
ipants in the final analysis. For the remaining participants, 
on average 6.65 % of episodes were excluded (  = 7.08%). 
Main Data Analysis 
For the main analysis reported in the manuscript, we fo-
cused on the RTs of turning the third card (card3 RT), con-
firming the outcome of the current trial (confirm RT) and 
starting the next trial (start RT). Confirm RT and start RT al-
lowed us to explore the effects of proximity and expectancy 
on response vigor. We included card3 RT to check whether 
participants were paying attention to each turned card dur-
ing the game (by determining if there was a difference be-
tween AA* and AB* sequences). In the Appendix, we pro-
vide an overview of how RT varied across all eight stages as 
a function of the amount (high vs. low) and outcome (AAA, 
AAB, ABB vs. ABC) of the current game. 
Card3 RT, confirm RT and start RT were submitted to 
repeated-measures ANOVAs, with outcome (AA* vs. AB* 
for card3 RT, as the third card had not been turned yet; 
and AAA, AAB, ABB vs. ABC for confirm and start RT) and 
amount (high vs. low) as within-subject factors. Results of 
these repeated-measures ANOVAs are shown in Table 1. We 
then conducted a series of paired-samples t tests (and their 
Bayesian equivalent), to further explore the effects of out-
come and amount. To explore the effect of outcome, we first 
combined high- and low-amount trials, and then compared 
each outcome against all other outcomes (see Table 2). To 
explore the effect of amount, we compared high-amount 
trials against low-amount trials within each outcome (see 
Table 3). For each comparison, we conducted a paired-sam-
ples t test, a Wilcoxon signed-rank test (to check if the re-
sult from the paired-samples t test is robust against non-
normal distributions), and the Bayesian paired-samples t 
test (to quantify the relative strength of evidence for two 
competing hypotheses, Dienes, 2014). A Bayes factor (
) of B indicates the data are B times more likely under the 
alternative hypothesis (the default prior Cauchy’s width = 
0.707) than under the null hypothesis. We corrected p val-
ues for multiple comparisons using the Holm-Bonferroni 
method, for paired-samples t tests and Wilcoxon signed-
rank tests separately, and for the effects of outcome and 
amount at each stage separately. Hedges’s gav was reported 
as the effect size (Lakens, 2013). Due to the large number 
of comparisons, we based our statistical inference on both 
the p values (after correcting for multiple comparisons) and 
the . Both (corrected) p-values had to be smaller than 
.05 and  > 3 to show substantial relative support for 
the alternative hypothesis, and  <  to show substan-
tial relative support for the null hypothesis. While the 
is a continuous measure of the relative likelihood of data 
under two hypotheses, we adopted the conventional cut-off 
values of 3 and  as substantial evidence for the alterna-
tive and the null, respectively, to facilitate statistical infer-
ence (Dienes, 2014). Furthermore, we conducted robustness 
checks of  in JASP (0.11.1, JASP Team, 2019), by using 
different prior widths. The qualitative conclusions using 3 
and  as the cut-off values remain the same when using 
different priors. The results of these robustness checks can 
be found at https://osf.io/erhft/, https://osf.io/a6kep/, and 
https://osf.io/fxjhn/, for the three experiments respectively. 
For completeness, in the tables we report the results of all 
comparisons. In the Results section below, we will focus on 
comparisons that are theoretically informative. 
Results 
Figure 2 gives an overview of RTs in the three stages of 
interest as a function of outcome and amount. 





 http://online.ucpress.edu/collabra/article-pdf/6/1/18184/443570/collabra_2020_6_1_18184.pdf by guest on 22 February 2021
Table 2: Effects of Outcome in Experiment 1 
Stage Comparison diff lowerCI upperCI t pt p w BF10 gav 




296 238 354 10.18  < .001  < .001 0.850 
AAA vs. 
ABB 
236 177 295 7.92  < .001  < .001 0.639 
AAA vs. 
ABC 
301 240 363 9.72  < .001  < .001 0.900 
AAB vs. 
ABB 
-60 -88 -33 -4.31  < .001  < .001 0.215 
AAB vs. 
ABC 
5 -18 29 0.43 0.666 0.477 0.120 0.021 
ABB vs. 
ABC 




138 108 168 9.00  < .001  < .001 0.496 
AAA vs. 
ABB 
135 104 166 8.63  < .001  < .001 0.499 
AAA vs. 
ABC 
121 91 151 8.09  < .001  < .001 0.437 
AAB vs. 
ABB 
-3 -20 13 -0.39 0.699 0.427 0.118 0.014 
AAB vs. 
ABC 
-17 -35 1 -1.83 0.209 0.063 0.550 0.069 
ABB vs. 
ABC 
-14 -30 3 -1.62 0.218 0.299 0.385 0.057 
Note. High-amount and low-amount condition are combined. diff = difference in response time (RT), in milliseconds; lowerCI = lower limit of 95% confidence interval; upperCI = up-
per limit of 95% confidence interval;  =  value from paired-sample t test;  =  value from paired-sample t test;  =  value from Wilcoxon signed-rank test;  and  are corrected 
for multiple comparisons within each stage using the Holm-Bonferroni method.  = Bayes factor, the likelihood of obtaining the current data under the alternative hypothesis, di-
vided by the likelihood of obtaining the current data under the null hypothesis (the default prior Cauchy’s width = 0.707 was used);  = Hedges’s average . 
Table 3: Effects of Amount in Experiment 1 
Stage Outcome diff lowerCI upperCI t pt p w BF10 gav 
Card3 
AA 26 0 51 2.01 0.095 0.126 0.752 0.085 
AB 9 -9 26 1.00 0.318 0.449 0.179 0.039 
Confirm 
AAA 67 28 105 3.40 0.004  < .001 22.82 0.149 
AAB 12 -18 41 0.78 0.873 1.000 0.147 0.043 
ABB 1 -27 30 0.08 0.934 1.000 0.110 0.004 
ABC -28 -57 1 -1.95 0.163 0.079 0.671 0.115 
Start 
AAA 54 21 86 3.30 0.005 0.009 17.12 0.167 
AAB 14 -9 37 1.18 0.481 0.400 0.215 0.055 
ABB -21 -41 0 -1.95 0.160 0.144 0.681 0.087 
ABC 0 -21 21 0.01 0.995 0.947 0.110 0.000 
Note. diff = difference in response time (RT) between high-amount and low-amount condition, in milliseconds (positive value indicates longer RT in the high-amount condition); low-
erCI = lower limit of 95% confidence interval; upperCI = upper limit of 95% confidence interval;  =  value from paired-sample t test;  =  value from paired-sample t test;  =  value 
from Wilcoxon signed-rank test;  and  are corrected for multiple comparisons within each stage using the Holm-Bonferroni method.  = Bayes factor, the likelihood of obtain-
ing the current data under the alternative hypothesis, divided by the likelihood of obtaining the current data under the null hypothesis (the default prior Cauchy’s width = 0.707 was 
used);  = Hedges’s average . 
Card3 RT 
For card3 RT, only the main effect of outcome was sta-
tistically significant (Table 1). Participants turned the third 
card more quickly when the first two cards differed (i.e., 
AB*) in comparison to when the first two cards matched 
(i.e., AA*). This effect cannot be easily explained by percep-
tual processes (e.g., participants identified AB* more quick-
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Figure 2: Card3, Confirm and Start RT in Experiment 1. Error bars stand for 95% within-subject confidence intervals. 
For card3 RT, the third card is unresolved: AAA, AAB = AA*; ABB, ABC = AB*. 
ly than AA*), as previous work on simple perceptual-match-
ing tasks indicates that people tend to match identical pairs 
of stimuli faster than different pairs (Goulet & Cousineau, 
2020; Nickerson, 1967), opposite to what we have observed 
here. Instead, this relative speeding up after AB* than after 
AA* may be explained by (potential) wins and losses. Re-
sponse vigor might increase after AB* (as AB* indicated a 
certain loss), consistent with the ‘increased vigor after a 
loss’ hypothesis. Alternatively, participants might strategi-
cally slow down after AA* to think about which card to turn 
next. These processes are not necessarily mutually exclu-
sive, and may simultaneously contribute to the difference in 
card3 RT after AA* versus AB*. Even though our data do not 
allow us to disentangle these processes, this difference in 
card3 RT after AA* versus AB* shows that participants were 
paying attention to each turned card as they went through 
a game. This is an important prerequisite for our manipula-
tion of expectancy, in which we assumed that participants 
paid attention to each turned card and adjusted their expec-
tation of winning accordingly as a game evolved. 
Confirm RT 
For confirm RT, both the main effect of outcome and the 
interaction effect with amount were statistically significant. 
Concerning the main effect of outcome, participants over-
all confirmed losses more quickly than wins (Table 2). More 
importantly, reward proximity decreased response vigor, 
such that participants confirmed ABB (high proximity, re-
duced expectancy) more slowly than ABC (low proximity, 
reduced expectancy), while reward expectancy seemed to 
increase response vigor, such that participants confirmed 
AAB (increased expectancy, high proximity) more quickly 
than ABB (reduced expectancy, high proximity); confirm 
RT: AAA  ABB  AAB  ABC. The confirm RT for AAB and 
ABC did not differ significantly from each other, and 
provided substantial evidence for the null hypothesis (
between  and ; Dienes, 2014). 
The interaction effect between outcome and amount was 
driven by the effect of amount within the win condition 
only (i.e., AAA). Participants confirmed a win of 60 points 
more slowly than a win of 12 points (in line with the post-
reinforcement pause effect, Felton & Lyon, 1966), whereas 
amount did not modulate confirm RT for losses. This lack 
of modulation by amount on loss trials (especially on the 
AAB trials) might be surprising, as one might argue that ex-
pecting to win 60 points and then having that hope dashed 
might induce more ‘frustration’, and hence more vigorous 
response, than expecting to win 12 points. In line with this 
speculation, Verbruggen et al. (2017) found that partici-
pants initiated the next trial more quickly after failing to 
obtain a high amount of points compared to a low amount 
of points. Furthermore, Yu et al. (2014) found participants 
pressed buttons with more force after being blocked from 
obtaining 2 pounds than 20 pence. In contrast to these pre-
vious findings, here we did not find such a modulation effect 
by amount on response vigor after reward omission. 
Start RT 
For start RT, again both the main effect of outcome and 
the interaction effect were statistically significant. Con-
cerning the comparisons between different outcomes, only 
the differences between wins and losses were statistically 
significant (start RT: AAA  ABB  AAB  ABC). Different 
loss outcomes did not differ significantly from each other 
(see Table 2). The interaction effect was again driven by the 
effect of amount within AAA only (Table 3). 
Wins versus losses seem to have a relatively persistent 
influence on response vigor. Our exploratory analyses 
showed that participants turned the first and second card of 
the next game more slowly after a win than after a loss (see 
Figure A1 in the Appendix). In contrast, the effects of ex-
pectancy and proximity seem relatively short-lived and are 
restricted to the confirm RT in the current experiment. 
Discussion 
High proximity reduced response vigor, such that par-
ticipants confirmed ABB more slowly than ABC. This effect 
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suggested that participants still paid attention to the last 
card, even after they already knew after turning the first 
two mismatching cards that they had lost (i.e., AB*). By 
contrast, increased expectancy seemed to increase response 
vigor, as indicated by the difference between AAB and ABB. 
No difference between AAB and ABC in confirm RT was ob-
served, which might suggest that the opposing effects of ex-
pectancy and proximity have canceled each other out. 
In Experiment 1, we used ABB as the loss condition with 
reduced expectancy and high proximity. However, this de-
sign choice may have introduced a confound. That is, for 
ABB, participants turned two matching cards in succession 
(i.e., the third card matches the second card), while for 
ABC, participants never turned two matching cards consec-
utively. The difference in confirm RT between ABB and ABC 
might therefore be caused by this confound, rather than by 
the appraisal of proximity per se. To address this question, 
in Experiment 2 we added ABA as an outcome. ABA is a loss 
with reduced expectancy and high proximity (like ABB), but 
without having two matching cards in succession. Thus, in 
both ABA and ABC, each turned card differs from the pre-
ceding card. The comparison between ABA and ABC would 
therefore allow us to address this potential confound in Ex-
periment 2. 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 was a replication and extension of Exper-
iment 1. We used the same materials, procedure and data 
analysis methods as in Experiment 1. The major difference 
was that in Experiment 2, we included an extra loss out-
come, namely ABA (i.e., the second card differed from the 
first and the third card), to further explore whether the dif-
ference in confirm RT between ABB and ABC depended on 
turning two matching cards consecutively. 
Method 
Participants 
The same eligibility criteria as in Experiment 1 were used 
to recruit participants on Prolific.co. In total, 149 partic-
ipants from Prolific.co took part in the experiment (90 
males, 58 females, 1 did not report their gender; 
, ). For this experiment, we initially 
planned to recruit 100 participants. However, after collect-
ing data from 100 participants, the Bayesian comparisons of 
confirm RT between ABA and AAB, and between ABA and 
ABC only showed ‘anecdotal’ evidence for the effects. We 
therefore decided to add another 50 participants. Data from 
1 participant were not recorded, leaving 49 extra partici-
pants in total 2. To correct for sequential testing, in Experi-
ment 2 we adopted an alpha level of .025 (.05/2 = 0.025) for 
statistical significance. Furthermore, we used JASP (0.11.1; 
JASP Team, 2019) to conduct Bayesian sequential tests on 
confirm RT between different loss outcomes, to show how 
the  changed after adding 49 more participants. JASP 
uses the BayesFactor package (Morey & Rouder, 2018) for 
calculating , but also provides the option to easily con-
duct and visualize sequential tests. The results of sequential 
analyses can be found in Figures A4, A5, and A6 in the Ap-
pendix. 
Apparatus, materials and procedure 
The same apparatus, materials and procedure as in Ex-
periment 1 were used. The only difference was that instead 
of including four possible outcomes, in the current experi-
ment we included six types of outcomes, namely AAA (win), 
AAB, AAC, ABA, ABB, and ABC. Note that the AAB and AAC 
conditions are equivalent. The reason for including these 
two outcomes was for achieving a more balanced design. 
That is, after both AA* and AB*, there was an equal chance 
of the third card being A, B or C. Since we increased the 
overall number of outcomes from four to six, we reduced 
the amount of trials per cell from 30 to 20, to keep the 
total amount of trials the same (240 trials). Because of these 
changes, the overall probability of winning thus decreased 
from  to . To make sure participants would win the same 
amount of points (i.e., 770 points including the initial 50 
points), we reduced the wager such that one low-amount 
game cost 1 point and one high-amount game cost 5 points 
(as opposed to 2 and 10 points in Experiment 1). The 
amount of points won for each AAA outcome remained the 
same (12 and 60 points). The overall expected value of a 
game in Experiment 2 was thus again positive (i.e., partici-
pants won points in the long run). The rest of the procedure 
remained the same. 
Data Analysis 
The same procedure was used for preparing RT data. One 
difference was that participants now needed to have at least 
10 episodes left per cell in order to be included in the analy-
sis. Data from 7 participants were excluded, leaving 142 
participants in the analysis. For the included participants, 
on average, 6.54 % of episodes were excluded (  = 6.13%). 
The same data analyses as in Experiment 1 were used. For 
all comparisons, AAB and AAC conditions were combined 
into AAB, as the two were effectively the same. 
Results & Discussion 
Card3 RT 
The main effects of outcome and amount were both sta-
tistically significant. Replicating the result of Experiment 1, 
participants turned the third card more quickly when the 
first two cards did not match (Table 5). Overall, participants 
turned the third card more slowly when there was a high 
amount at stake, and this effect of amount seemed to be 
more pronounced when the first two cards matched (Table 
6; the interaction effect between outcome and amount was 
not statistically significant though). 
Confirm RT 
For confirm RT, the main effects of outcome, amount, 
and the interaction effect were all statistically significant. 
Replicating the findings in Experiment 1, participants con-
firmed losses more quickly than wins (confirm RT: AAA 
ABB  ABA  AAB  ABC). They again confirmed AAB more 
quickly than ABB (i.e., increased expectancy seemed to in-
crease vigor), and ABB more slowly than ABC (i.e., high 
In total, 15 participants reserved a slot and then withdrew; 2 participants were ‘timed out’. We do not have data from these participants. 2 
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Table 4: Repeated-Measures ANOVAs in Experiment 2 
Stage Effect F df1 df2 MSE p ges 
Card3 
Outcome 64.88 1 141 57,178.35 < .001 .069 
Amount 6.98 1 141 4,522.80 .009 .001 
Outcome × Amount 2.83 1 141 4,417.92 .095 .000 
Confirm 
Outcome 100.69 1.91 269.20 212,846.78 < .001 .162 
Amount 13.69 1 141 19,387.84 < .001 .001 
Outcome × Amount 6.67 4.29 605.48 21,820.83 < .001 .003 
Start 
Outcome 73.86 2.80 394.70 34,670.56 < .001 .071 
Amount 8.01 1 141 9,075.17 .005 .001 
Outcome × Amount 4.99 4.09 577.24 13,501.71 .001 .003 
Note. ,  = degrees of freedom, decimal numbers are the Greenhouse-Geisser corrected s;  = mean-squared errors;  = generalized eta-squared. 
Figure 3: Card3, Confirm and Start RT in Experiment 2. Error bars stand for 95% within-subject confidence intervals. 
For card3 RT, the third card is unresolved: AAA, AAB, AAC = AA*; ABA, ABB, ABC = AB* 
proximity seemed to decrease vigor), while no difference 
between AAB and ABC was observed. The crucial tests for 
Experiment 2 were the comparisons between ABA and the 
other loss outcomes. Overall, confirm RT for ABA did not 
differ from ABB. Participants confirmed AAB more quickly 
than ABA (i.e., effect of expectancy), and ABA more slow-
ly than ABC (i.e., effect of proximity) (Table 5). Using both 
ABB and ABA as the high-proximity, reduced-expectancy 
condition, we therefore replicated the (opposing) effects of 
expectancy and proximity on confirm RT. 
The interaction effect between outcome and amount 
again seemed to be driven by slower confirmation of large 
wins than small wins. For the losses, amount again did not 
modulate confirm RT (Table 6). 
Overall, this pattern of results showed that the appraisal 
of high proximity reduces response vigor, even when par-
ticipants do not turn two matching cards in succession (as 
in the case of ABA). These results thus ruled out an alter-
native explanation, and strengthened the conclusion that 
high proximity reduces response vigor after reward omis-
sion. One important caveat for both the effects of proximity 
and expectancy is that we only tested the effect of proximity 
within losses that had reduced expectancy of winning, and 
the effect of expectancy within losses that were proximal to 
a win. Our design thus lacked the low-proximity, increased-
expectancy outcome (which does not seem feasible with our 
current task), which makes the interpretation of the results 
on confirm RT difficult. For instance, we observed no differ-
ence in confirm RT between a high-proximity, increased-ex-
pectancy outcome (AAB) and a low-proximity, reduced-ex-
pectancy outcome (ABC). This could indicate that the op-
posing effects of expectancy (increased vigor) and proxim-
ity (decreased vigor) cancel each other out on AAB trials. 
Alternatively, the effect of proximity and expectancy may 
be conditional on each other, and may jointly reduce re-
sponse vigor only for high-proximity, reduced-expectancy 
outcomes (i.e., ABB). In other words, the lack of difference 
between AAB and ABC may suggest there are no separate 
effects of proximity and expectancy (only a joint effect). The 
start RT findings reported in the following section provide 
some support for the first account that assumes opposing 
effects of proximity and expectancy on AAB trials. 
Start RT 
For start RT, the two main effects and the interaction ef-
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Table 5: Effects of Outcome in Experiment 2 
Stage Comparison diff lowerCI upperCI t p t p w 




431 365 498 12.83  < .001  < .001 1.084 
AAA vs. 
ABA 
368 295 440 10.07  < .001  < .001 0.824 
AAA vs. 
ABB 
372 301 442 10.45  < .001  < .001 0.865 
AAA vs. 
ABC 
440 364 516 11.45  < .001  < .001 1.109 
AAB vs. 
ABA 
-64 -96 -31 -3.83  < .001  < .001 88.31 0.217 
AAB vs. 
ABB 
-59 -86 -33 -4.40  < .001  < .001 0.215 
AAB vs. 
ABC 
9 -17 36 0.69 0.984 0.434 0.118 0.038 
ABA vs. 
ABB 
4 -19 28 0.35 0.984 0.866 0.099 0.013 
ABA vs. 
ABC 
73 37 109 3.99  < .001  < .001 0.249 
ABB vs. 
ABC 




186 156 217 12.21  < .001  < .001 0.757 
AAA vs. 
ABA 
169 137 202 10.33  < .001  < .001 0.690 
AAA vs. 
ABB 
152 120 184 9.46  < .001  < .001 0.600 
AAA vs. 
ABC 
158 126 189 9.89  < .001  < .001 0.632 
AAB vs. 
ABA 
-17 -32 -2 -2.30 0.093 0.174 1.18 0.086 
AAB vs. 
ABB 
-34 -49 -19 -4.58  < .001  < .001 0.163 
AAB vs. 
ABC 
-29 -44 -13 -3.61 0.002 0.003 41.89 0.140 
ABA vs. 
ABB 
-17 -33 -0 -2.03 0.134 0.256 0.679 0.081 
ABA vs. 
ABC 
-11 -30 7 -1.26 0.422 0.635 0.202 0.056 
ABB vs. 
ABC 
5 -12 23 0.60 0.548 0.635 0.112 0.026 
Note. High-amount and low-amount condition are combined. AAB and AAC are combined into AAB. diff = difference in response time (RT), in milliseconds; lowerCI = lower limit of 
95% confidence interval; upperCI = upper limit of 95% confidence interval;  =  value from paired-sample t test;  =  value from paired-sample t test;  =  value from Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test;  and  are corrected for multiple comparisons within each stage using the Holm-Bonferroni method.  = Bayes factor, the likelihood of obtaining the current 
data under the alternative hypothesis, divided by the likelihood of obtaining the current data under the null hypothesis (the default prior Cauchy’s width = 0.707 was used);  = 
Hedges’s average . 
fect were statistically significant. Participants started the 
next trial more quickly after a loss than after a win (Table 
5), and they ‘paused’ longer after a big win than after a 
small win (Table 6). Amount did not influence start RT with-
in losses. The comparisons among different losses, though, 
showed an interesting change. Participants started a new 
game more quickly after AAB than after both ABB and ABC, 
whereas the latter two did not differ (start RT: AAB  ABC 
 ABB  ABA; Note the start RT was shorter for AAB than 
for ABA, but the difference did not reach statistical sig-
nificance). Remember that for confirm RT, we observed a 
slightly different pattern: AAB  ABC  ABB  ABA). This 
quicker initiation of a new game after AAB than after ABC 
(and ABB) could indicate that the slowing effect of prox-
imity dissipated more quickly than the invigoration effect 
of expectancy. This in turn suggests that both the effect of 
proximity and expectancy may indeed be present in the first 
place in confirm RT for AAB, but may have canceled each 
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Table 6: Effects of Amount in Experiment 2 
Stage Outcome diff lowerCI upperCI t p w 
Card3 
AA 24 7 42 2.72 0.015 0.036 3.18 0.069 
AB 6 -8 19 0.81 0.416 0.927 0.129 0.023 
Confirm 
AAA 104 62 146 4.88  < .001  < .001 0.185 
AAB 28 6 50 2.56 0.046 0.167 2.18 0.112 
ABA -5 -34 23 -0.38 1.000 1.000 0.100 0.015 
ABB 0 -30 31 0.03 1.000 1.000 0.093 0.002 
ABC -6 -38 27 -0.34 1.000 1.000 0.099 0.022 
Start 
AAA 69 35 103 4.04  < .001 0.003 0.224 
AAB 0 -14 15 0.05 1.000 1.000 0.094 0.002 
ABA -6 -27 14 -0.59 1.000 1.000 0.111 0.029 
ABB 9 -15 32 0.72 1.000 1.000 0.121 0.037 
ABC 6 -14 27 0.60 1.000 1.000 0.112 0.029 
Note. AAB and AAC are combined into AAB. diff = difference in response time (RT) between high-amount and low-amount condition, in milliseconds (positive value indicates longer 
RT in the high-amount condition); lowerCI = lower limit of 95% confidence interval; upperCI = upper limit of 95% confidence interval;  =  value from paired-sample t test;  =  value 
from paired-sample t test;  =  value from Wilcoxon signed-rank test;  and  are corrected for multiple comparisons within each stage using the Holm-Bonferroni method.  = 
Bayes factor, the likelihood of obtaining the current data under the alternative hypothesis, divided by the likelihood of obtaining the current data under the null hypothesis (the de-
fault prior Cauchy’s width = 0.707 was used);  = Hedges’s average . 
other out. 
Experiment 3 
In Experiments 1 and 2, we consistently found that high 
proximity of a loss to a win reduced response vigor, while 
increased expectancy of reward as games unfolded seemed 
to increase it. Expectancy varies as a game evolves, and this 
variation in expectancy may also be influenced by the over-
all probability of winning. In Experiment 3, we thus manip-
ulated the winning probability across games, to explore its 
potential influence on response vigor. 
Method 
Participants 
In total, 103 participants participated in Experiment 3. 
Two participants finished more than half of the trials before 
restarting the experiment and were therefore excluded3. 
Another 2 participants had fewer than 100 trials recorded 
and were also excluded. The final sample consisted of 99 
participants (54 males, 45 females; , 
. 
Apparatus, materials and procedure 
The same apparatus, materials and general procedure as 
in the previous two experiments were used. The main dif-
ference was that instead of manipulating the amount of po-
tential wins (which did not seem to influence the effects 
of proximity and expectancy much after a loss), we ma-
nipulated the probability of winning across games. Partici-
Table 7: Number of Trials in Each Condition in Experiment 
3 
Win Prob AAA AAB ABB ABC 
High 32 16 16 8 
Medium 18 18 18 18 
Low 8 16 16 32 
pants were informed that they would play the scratch card 
game in three different casinos, where the chance of win-
ning would be high, medium or low, respectively. Cards of 
different colors (either blue, red and green) were used in 
three casinos to indicate the probability of winning. The as-
signment of each card color to each casino was randomized 
across participants. Participants played 72 trials in each 
casino. For the trial distribution in each condition, see 
Table 7. The overall probability of winning in the three casi-
nos was ,  and , respectively. Accordingly, the con-
ditional probability of winning after getting AA* was , , 
and . Thus, if participants successfully learned the differ-
ent winning probabilities from the three casinos, their ex-
pectancy of winning might show a larger increase after get-
ting AA* in the high win probability condition (where the 
chance of getting another A for the last card was ), fol-
lowed by the medium win probability condition, and then 
the low win probability condition. 
The order of visiting the three casinos was randomly 
generated at the beginning of the experiment and then 
fixed for each participant. Participants always played 3 
Another participant finished 3 trials before restarting the experiment. Data from this participant were included. 11 participants initially 
reserved a slot and then withdrew; 3 participants were ‘timed out’. We do not have data from these participants. 
3 
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Table 8: Estimation of Winning Probabilities in Experiment 3 





15 10 20 6.10  < .001  < .001 0.767 
High vs. Low 21 15 28 6.34  < .001  < .001 0.970 
Medium vs. 
Low 
7 2 11 2.99 0.004 0.002 7.19 0.341 
Est vs. 
Real 
High 11 6 15 4.70  < .001  < .001 0.971 
Medium 15 12 19 9.01  < .001  < .001 1.860 
Low 23 18 27 9.97  < .001  < .001 2.060 
Note: Est = estimated win probability, Real = real win probability. 
games in a specific casino before switching to another one. 
The order of games was randomized within each casino, 
with the constraint that the balance never fell below 0. Note 
that since in Experiment 2 we observed no difference be-
tween ABB and ABA, in Experiment 3 we again only includ-
ed ABB as the high-proximity, reduced-expectancy condi-
tion (as in Experiment 1), to reduce the number of outcomes 
we needed to include. The rest of the procedure remained 
the same as in Experiment 1. 
Each trial started with the message “Press any number 
key to purchase the game (5 points). Chance of winning 30 
points: XYZ” (XYZ could be low, medium or high) printed 
on screen. Note that the amount of points participants 
could win on a single trial was adjusted to 30, so that they 
would end up with a comparable amount of points (710) as 
in the previous experiments. The expected value of a game 
in both the high and medium win probability ‘casinos’ was 
positive (participants won 600 and 180 points, respective-
ly), while the expected value of a game in the low win prob-
ability ‘casino’ was negative (participants lost 120 points in 
total). In addition to showing the balance, the win probabil-
ity level of the current casino was also displayed at the bot-
tom of the screen (win odds: low, medium or high). The rest 
of the trial procedure remained the same. 
As a manipulation check, after the scratch card task, par-
ticipants were presented with the three cards used in the 
three casinos again, one by one. For each card, they were 
asked to estimate how often they thought they won in the 
casino that used that card, on a slider from 0% till 100%. 
They then filled out the UPPS-P impulsive behavior scale 




Since the low win probability condition contained only 
8 AAA trials, and the high win probability condition con-
tained only 8 ABC trials, we used a less strict rule for data 
exclusion. Participants needed to have at least 5 episodes 
in each cell in order to be included in the analysis (see also 
Verbruggen et al., 2017). Data from 5 participants were ex-
cluded, leaving 94 participants in the following analysis. For 
the remaining participants, on average 4.89% of episodes 
were excluded (  = 6.06%). 
Main Data Analysis 
Card3, confirm and start RT were submitted to repeated-
measures ANOVAs, with win probability and outcome as 
within-subject factors. To explore the simple main effects 
of outcome, the three win probability conditions were com-
bined, and each outcome was contrasted with all other out-
comes (Table 10). To explore the simple main effects of win 
probability, we contrasted high vs. medium, high vs. low 
and medium vs. low win probability within each outcome 
(Table 11). We used the same analyses as in previous exper-
iments for each comparison, and reported all of them for 
completeness. 
Results & Discussion 
Estimation of Win Probability 
As a manipulation check, after the scratch card task, par-
ticipants estimated how often they had won in each of the 
casinos. We compared participant’s estimation of win prob-
ability across different conditions, and also compared the 
estimated win probability against the true win probability 
for each condition (see Table 8). Overall, participants tend-
ed to over-estimate the probability of winning, and the 
over-estimation was more pronounced when the real win 
probability was relatively low (see the test Est vs. Real in 
Table 8). However, they did estimate the win probability to 
be the highest for the high win probability condition, fol-
lowed by the medium win probability condition, and to be 
the lowest for the low win probability condition. These re-
sults thus suggest that our manipulation was successful and 
participants perceived differences in win probabilities as 
expected. However, the perceived differences in win proba-
bilities seemed to be smaller than the actual differences be-
tween conditions. 
Card3 RT 
For card3 RT, the main effect of outcome, win probabil-
ity, and the interaction effect, were all statistically signifi-
cant. Again, participants slowed down after AA* than AB* 
(Table 10), supporting our assumption that they paid atten-
tion to each turned card as they progressed in a game. Win 
probability modulated response vigor, such that less fre-
quent events (e.g., AA* in the low win probability condition 
and AB* in the high win probability condition) led to longer 





 http://online.ucpress.edu/collabra/article-pdf/6/1/18184/443570/collabra_2020_6_1_18184.pdf by guest on 22 February 2021
Table 9: Repeated-Measures ANOVAs in Experiment 3 
Stage Effect F df1 df2 MSE p ges 
Card3 
Outcome 39.32 1 93 70,088.69 < .001 .047 
Win Prob 5.23 1.87 173.55 11,699.47 .007 .002 
Outcome × Win Prob 13.81 1.89 175.97 15,793.99 < .001 .007 
Confirm 
Outcome 35.18 1.41 130.94 299,393.53 < .001 .090 
Win Prob 1.31 1.81 168.46 25,311.40 .270 .000 
Outcome × Win Prob 5.32 4.74 440.98 32,277.52 < .001 .005 
Start 
Outcome 52.03 2.19 203.31 37,665.62 < .001 .047 
Win Prob 0.50 1.99 184.88 11,650.42 .604 .000 
Outcome × Win Prob 0.92 4.98 462.70 19,671.65 .470 .001 
Note. ,  = degrees of freedom, decimal numbers are the Greenhouse-Geisser corrected dfs;  = mean-squared errors;  = generalized eta-squared. 
Table 10: Effects of Outcome in Experiment 3 
Stage Comparison diff lowerCI upperCI t p w 




268 195 342 7.28  < .001  < .001 0.671 
AAA vs. 
ABB 
234 151 317 5.60  < .001  < .001 0.589 
AAA vs. 
ABC 
282 193 372 6.30  < .001  < .001 0.747 
AAB vs. 
ABB 
-34 -67 -2 -2.09 0.078 0.023 0.916 0.130 
AAB vs. 
ABC 
14 -24 52 0.73 0.468 0.856 0.148 0.057 
ABB vs. 
ABC 




163 130 197 9.78  < .001  < .001 0.599 
AAA vs. 
ABB 
127 95 159 7.89  < .001  < .001 0.459 
AAA vs. 
ABC 
122 88 155 7.15  < .001  < .001 0.432 
AAB vs. 
ABB 
-36 -59 -13 -3.09 0.005 0.005 9.46 0.153 
AAB vs. 
ABC 
-42 -62 -22 -4.18  < .001  < .001 0.174 
ABB vs. 
ABC 
-6 -26 14 -0.56 0.574 0.673 0.133 0.023 
Note. The three winning conditions are combined. diff = difference in response time (RT), in milliseconds; lowerCI = lower limit of 95% confidence interval; upperCI = upper limit of 
95% confidence interval;  =  value from paired-sample t test;  =  value from paired-sample t test;  =  value from Wilcoxon signed-rank test;  and  are corrected for multiple 
comparisons within each stage using the Holm-Bonferroni method.  = Bayes factor, the likelihood of obtaining the current data under the alternative hypothesis, divided by the 
likelihood of obtaining the current data under the null hypothesis (the default prior Cauchy’s width = 0.707 was used);  = Hedges’s average . 
card3 RT (Table 11; see also Figure 4, left panel). Howev-
er, the modulation effect by win probability seemed larg-
er for potential wins (i.e., AA*) than for losses (i.e., AB*). 
Part of the slowing down after infrequent events may be ex-
plained by surprise (e.g., attentional reorienting; Notebaert 
et al., 2009). This modulation of card3 RT by win probability 
shows that participants processed the win probability infor-
mation during the game. 
Confirm RT 
For confirm RT, the main effect of outcome and the in-
teraction effect were statistically significant. For the main 
effect of outcome, previous results were largely replicated 
(Table 10). Participants overall confirmed losses more 
quickly than wins, and confirmed ABB more slowly than 
ABC (i.e., the effect of proximity), while no difference be-
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Figure 4: Card3, Confirm and Start RT in Experiment 3. Error bars stand for 95% within-subject confidence intervals. 
For card3 RT, the third card is unresolved: AAA, AAB = AA*; ABB, ABC = AB* 
tween AAB and ABC was found (potential cancellation of 
expectancy and proximity effects). One deviation from the 
previous findings, though, was that the comparison be-
tween AAB and ABB using a paired-samples t test was not 
statistically significant (after correcting for multiple com-
parisons). The Bayes factor also showed uninformative evi-
dence. However, the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank 
test did show a statistically significant difference, with 
shorter confirm RT for AAB than for ABB. Although the ef-
fect was in the same direction as those observed in Exper-
iments 1 and 2, it should be interpreted with caution, as 
the global manipulation of expectations of winning (via dif-
ferent overall win probabilities) in the current experiment 
might interfere with the local manipulation of expectancy 
(via card sequences). 
The interaction effect between outcome and win proba-
bility was driven by the modulation of confirm RT by win 
probability for wins (AAA), but not for losses (Table 11). 
Participants ‘paused’ longer after a win when the overall 
win probability was low. Surprisingly, although card3 RT 
was modulated by win probability after AA* (suggesting po-
tential difference in participants’ expectation of winning), 
this modulation effect was not observed for confirm RT of 
AAB, when participants eventually lost. Our global manip-
ulation of expectations of winning thus failed to influence 
response vigor after AAB. 
Start RT 
For start RT, only the main effect of outcome was statisti-
cally significant. Interestingly, start RT was again faster af-
ter AAB than after ABB and ABC (Table 10; AAB  ABB 
ABC), consistent with what was observed in Experiment 2. 
The potential response invigoration effect by increased ex-
pectancy may therefore be more persistent than the slowing 
effect of high proximity. 
General Discussion 
The present study explored the effect of proximity and 
expectancy on response vigor after reward omission. Par-
ticipants played a series of online ‘scratch card’ games, in 
which they turned three cards one by one, and won points 
when all three cards matched (and lost their wager when 
there was a mismatch). By varying the sequence of cards 
on the loss trials, we independently manipulated the ap-
praisals of proximity and expectancy. Across three exper-
iments, we consistently found that (1) participants con-
firmed the outcome and started a new game more quickly 
after a loss than a win; (2) when confirming a loss, high 
proximity reduced response vigor (i.e., for confirm RT: 
high-proximity, reduced-expectancy [ABB and ABA]  low-
proximity, reduced-expectancy [ABC]), while increased ex-
pectancy seemed to increase response vigor (confirm RT: 
high-proximity, increased-expectancy [AAB]  high-prox-
imity, reduced-expectancy [ABB and ABA]) and might can-
cel out the opposing effect of proximity (confirm RT: high-
proximity, increased-expectancy [AAB]  low-proximity, re-
duced-expectancy [ABC]); (3) the amount of reward at stake 
and the overall probability of winning influenced confirm 
RT and start RT after wins, but not after losses. Below we 
discuss the implications of these findings in detail. 
Persistent Influence of Wins and Losses on Response 
Vigor 
After turning the last card in a game, participants needed 
to confirm the outcome and start a new game. For both re-
sponses, we observed shorter RTs after a loss than a win. 
This difference probably reflects a modulation of response 
vigor by the presence and absence of reward. Due to the lack 
of a non-gamble baseline, we could not distinguish between 
decreased response vigor triggered by reward (i.e., post-re-
inforcement pause) and increased response vigor triggered 
by non-reward (i.e., post-loss speeding). However, post-re-
inforcement pause likely contributed to the difference be-
tween wins and losses. After all, participants responded 
more slowly after getting a large reward than a small re-
ward, which is in line with previous findings on post-rein-
forcement pause (M. J. Dixon et al., 2013). As wins of high 
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and low amounts occurred with equal probability, it seems 
unlikely that this difference was caused by response slowing 
after unexpected events. 
As shown in the Appendix, the effects of wins vs. losses 
persisted further into the next game, such that participants 
turned the first and the second card of the next game more 
quickly after losses compared to wins (see Figures A1, A2, 
and A3 in the Appendix). To the extent that participants 
(erroneously) believed that there were hidden rules in the 
game and they could influence the outcome by discovering 
and exploiting these rules, increasing the speed of turning 
cards after losses seems counter-intuitive. Indeed, recent 
work employing a rock-paper-scissors game has shown that 
participants initiated a new game more quickly after a loss 
in an uncontrollable game, but they initiated a new game 
more slowly after a loss when there was a certain pattern 
in their opponents’ responses that they could successfully 
exploit (Dyson et al., 2018). This prolonged initiation time 
after a loss against exploitable opponents might partly re-
sult from more strategic thinking of one’s next move in this 
case. The ‘scratch card’ task used here does not contain 
such exploitable patterns, so it is possible that participants 
eventually realized that they had no control over the out-
come, and thus forwent any strategic thinking of which card 
to turn next. Furthermore, since participants were accumu-
lating points throughout the experiment, they might also 
gradually become less sensitive to wins and losses. In line 
with this speculation, in all three experiments participants 
overall responded more quickly in the second half of the ex-
periment than in the first half. Furthermore, the effects of 
wins and losses on confirm and start RTs appeared to be 
smaller in the second half (although even in the second half, 
participants still responded more quickly after a loss com-
pared to after a win. See the exploratory analyses on osf.io/
vuy95/). Overall, these results showed that wins vs. losses 
had a persistent influence on response vigor, from confirm-
ing the outcome of the current game, till turning the second 
card of the next game, spanning 4 consecutive responses in 
total. 
Distinct Influences of Expectancy and Proximity on 
Response Vigor 
Even though the outcome was objectively the same for 
AAB, ABB, ABA, and ABC trials, we observed differences be-
tween these trial types. In all three experiments, we consis-
tently observed that high proximity reduced response vig-
or after reward omission. Increased expectancy seemed to 
have an opposing effect, as participants confirmed a (proxi-
mal) loss more quickly when they had increased expectancy 
of winning as the game evolved. Although the effect of ex-
pectancy on confirm RT was not statistically significant in 
Experiment 3, it was in the same direction as in Experi-
ments 1 and 2. Furthermore, the meta-analyzed effect com-
bining results from all three experiments showed that over-
all participants did confirm AAB more quickly than ABB 
(meta-analyzed result: diff = -54 ms, 95% CI = [-70, -37], 
; see Table A1 in the Appendix for results of meta-
analyses for all comparisons). Furthermore, response invig-
oration after increased expectancy also fits the findings by 
Bossuyt et al. (2014), who showed that increased expectan-
cy increased feelings of frustration, anger and regret. We 
therefore conclude that increased expectancy of winning (at 
least triggered by the card sequence of AAB) increased re-
sponse vigor in the current research. 
In all three experiments, participants confirmed high-
proximity, increased-expectancy outcomes (AAB) and low-
proximity, reduced-expectancy outcomes (ABC) equally 
quickly (see also M. J. Dixon et al., 2013). As discussed 
above, one interpretation for this finding is that the effect 
of proximity might have canceled out the opposing effect 
of expectancy, resulting in no difference between AAB and 
ABC on confirm RT. Alternatively, the effect of proximity 
and expectancy may be dependent on each other, and may 
jointly influence response vigor only after high-proximity, 
reduced-expectancy outcomes (i.e., ABB). According to this 
second account, no effects of proximity and expectancy 
were present in the AAB trials, rather than there being two 
opposing effects that canceled each other out. While this 
second account may explain the pattern observed for con-
firm RT, it has difficulty in explaining the observation that 
participants started a new game more quickly after AAB 
than after ABC (meta-analyzed result: diff = -29 ms, 95% 
CI = [-42, -16],   .001), and also more quickly after AAB 
than after ABB (meta-analyzed result: diff = -21 ms, 95% CI 
= [-39, -3],  = .043;  value corrected for multiple compar-
isons). These differences in start RT after AAB on the one 
hand, and ABC and ABB on the other hand, suggest that the 
invigoration effect of increased expectancy may be more 
persistent than the slowing effect of high proximity (thus 
resulting in overall shorter start RT after AAB than ABC and 
ABB), which in turn implies that both effects are indeed 
present when participants need to confirm AAB outcomes. 
Since AAB triggered increased expectancy of winning after 
the first two cards, the eventual loss may be more unexpect-
ed. This may initially orient attention towards the source 
of expectancy violation, thereby slowing down the response 
of confirming AAB (Notebaert et al., 2009; Wessel, 2018). 
No such orienting process would occur for the response of 
starting the next game, hence the start RT for AAB is lower 
than for ABC and ABB. Assuming effects of both proximity 
and expectancy thus offers a potential explanation for the 
overall pattern of results. In the following, we focus on the 
theoretical implications of the effects of proximity and ex-
pectancy on response vigor. 
According to Frijda and colleagues (Frijda, 2010; Frijda 
et al., 2014), changes in states of action readiness are trig-
gered by how events are appraised by individuals. Such 
states of action readiness can manifest in overt actions, 
with a certain strength and urgency (i.e., response vigor). 
In Frijda et al.'s framework, responses become more vigor-
ous when the perceived discrepancy between the current 
state and a reference state becomes larger (Frijda, 2010). 
The effects of proximity and expectancy on response vigor 
may therefore be understood in terms of the discrepancy 
between the current state and a reference state. A proximal 
loss may indicate a more desirable current state than a dis-
tal loss, as players may confuse a game of chance as a game 
of skill, and take a proximal loss as an indication that they 
are getting better at the game (and that a reward is coming 
soon; Clark, 2010). Perceiving a proximal loss to be more 
desirable than a distal loss may thus lead to a smaller dis-
crepancy and lower response vigor (while controlling for ex-
pectancy). Similarly, when participants still expect to ob-
tain rewards before turning the last card (as in AAB), the 
reference state is more desirable compared to when they do 
not expect to obtain rewards anymore (the utility of an op-
tion is determined by both the value of an outcome and the 
expectancy of obtaining the outcome; Moors et al., 2017). 
After turning the last card and losing, the discrepancy be-
tween the current and the reference state is therefore larg-
er for a loss after increased expectancy of winning than a 
loss after reduced expectancy of winning (while control-
ling for proximity), leading to increased response vigor in 
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the former case. The magnitude of the discrepancy between 
the current state and a reference state may also explain the 
overall difference in response vigor after wins versus losses, 
since wins essentially entail no discrepancy, which is always 
smaller than the discrepancies encountered in losses. 
Based on a similar feedback-based control process view, 
Carver & Scheier (1990) also proposed that organisms act 
to reduce the discrepancy between the current state and 
a reference state (they also proposed an avoidance system 
in which organisms act to enlarge the discrepancy between 
their current state and anti-goals, but that seems less rele-
vant here). Importantly, a second loop monitors the rate at 
which the discrepancy is being reduced by the first action 
loop, and compares the rate of discrepancy reduction to 
a reference value. This second so-called meta-monitoring 
loop is responsible for the generation of affect: when the 
sensed rate of discrepancy reduction is higher than the ref-
erence value, organisms experience positive affect and re-
duce the effort of ongoing responses (coasting; Carver, 
2003); when the sensed rate of discrepancy reduction is 
lower than the reference value, organisms experience neg-
ative affect and increase the effort of ensuing responses 
(Carver, 2004). Thus, Carver & Scheier (1990) attributed 
positive and negative affect, as well as the associated 
changes in response vigor, to the rate of discrepancy reduc-
tion rather than the magnitude of discrepancy (cf. Frijda, 
2010). A proximal loss in the ‘scratch card’ task may cor-
respond to a smaller difference between the sensed rate of 
discrepancy reduction and a reference value than a distal 
loss (e.g., the sensed rate of discrepancy reduction may be 
higher for a proximal loss, as people may erroneously be-
lieve they are getting better at the game), whereas a loss af-
ter increased expectancy may correspond to a larger differ-
ence than a loss after reduced expectancy (e.g., the refer-
ence value may be higher for a loss after increased winning 
expectancy). Despite the difference in the proposed origin 
of affect, both frameworks converge on the idea that posi-
tive affect is associated with things going well (either due to 
a small discrepancy or a high rate of discrepancy reduction) 
and response vigor can be reduced, while negative affect 
is associated with things not going so well (either due to 
a large discrepancy or a low rate of discrepancy reduction) 
and response vigor should be increased. Since increased ex-
pectancy before losing increased negative affect and high 
proximity increased positive affect (Bossuyt et al., 2014), 
the corresponding increase and decrease of response vigor 
by expectancy and proximity, respectively, are also in line 
with this broad idea. 
Surprisingly, the amount of reward at stake and the over-
all probability of winning did not modulate the effect of 
proximity and expectancy (manipulated via card sequences) 
on loss trials. In an exploratory analysis combining data 
from 137 participants, Verbruggen et al. (2017) found that 
participants started a new trial more quickly after failing 
to obtain a large reward (with a low win probability) com-
pared to a small reward (with a relatively high win proba-
bility). Similarly, Yu et al. (2014) observed that participants 
reported higher levels of frustration and applied more force 
in pressing buttons when failing to get 2 pounds vs. 20 
pence. Here, we independently manipulated reward magni-
tude and the overall winning probability, but failed to ob-
serve a modulation effect by either factor. This lack of mod-
ulation cannot be explained by participants not processing 
the magnitude or probability information during the game, 
as the RT of turning the last card after getting AA* is clearly 
influenced by reward magnitude and probability (although 
not statistically reliable in Experiment 1). Some procedural 
differences may explain this inconsistency in results. In the 
experiments by Verbruggen et al. (2017), participants could 
chose to gamble or not, which might amplify the effect of 
reward magnitude when participants voluntarily chose to 
gamble and then lost. Yu et al. (2014) did not use a gamble 
task, but used two reward amounts (2 pounds vs. 20 pence) 
that differed much more from each other than the ones used 
here (30 pence vs. 6 pence). Either of these differences may 
explain why we did not observe any effect of reward magni-
tude and win probability on response vigor after a loss here. 
Another possibility is that the appraisal of expectancy and 
proximity (as manipulated via card sequences here) is a very 
fast process (Frijda et al., 2014), and influences response 
vigor without taking into account more fine-grained infor-
mation, such as reward magnitude and probability. These 
possibilities can be further explored in future work. 
In the current research we investigated the effects of 
proximity and expectancy on response vigor within the con-
text of gambling, as the structural features of certain gam-
bling scenarios (e.g., the sequential presentation of symbols 
on scratch cards and slot machines) makes the manipu-
lation of proximity and expectancy relatively straightfor-
ward. Future work may further examine these effects in oth-
er contexts in which people pursue rewards (and either suc-
ceed or fail in obtaining rewards), to see if the current find-
ings can be generalized to other reward-seeking behaviors. 
While the independent manipulation of proximity and ex-
pectancy may be difficult in other more naturalistic set-
tings, soliciting people’s subjective appraisals of proximity 
and expectancy (which we did not include here) may help 
address this problem. Furthermore, the potential identifica-
tion of low-proximity, increased-expectancy events (an out-
come that we could not include in the current design) may 
also lead to a better understanding of how the goal pursuit 
process is adjusted based on the appraisals of proximity and 
expectancy. 
Implications for Near Miss in Gambling 
‘Near misses’ in gambling contribute to gambling persis-
tence, and has received substantial attention from gambling 
researchers. Different theoretical accounts have been pro-
posed, emphasizing either the proximity of a ‘near miss’ to 
a win or the increased expectancy of winning (and hence, 
the unexpectedness of loss) in a ‘near miss’. According to 
the cognitive distortion account, gamblers may mistake 
games of chance (i.e., gambling) as games of skill, and take 
a ‘near-miss’ as an indication of skill acquisition and a sig-
nal of imminent rewards (Clark, 2010; Clark et al., 2009; 
Reid, 1986). ‘Near misses’ may also acquire reinforcing 
properties via Pavlovian generalization, and reinforce gam-
bling just as actual wins, due to its perceptual similarity to 
wins (Belisle & Dixon, 2016; Peters et al., 2010). These two 
accounts thus emphasize the proximity of a ‘near miss’ to 
a win. The frustration account, on the other hand, argues 
that a ‘near miss’ may elicit more frustration than a regular 
loss, and motivate gamblers to quickly remove themselves 
from the aversive state by continuing gambling (M. J. Dixon 
et al., 2011, 2013; Sharman & Clark, 2016; Stange et al., 
2016, 2017). Since the appraisal of expectancy rather than 
proximity contributes to the subjective feeling of frustra-
tion (Bossuyt et al., 2014), the frustration account seems to 
emphasize the increased expectancy of winning in a ‘near 
miss’. Our results suggest both factors may play a role here. 
The most widely used type of ‘near miss’, namely AAB, trig-
gers an appraisal of both increased expectancy and high 
proximity. Compared to a full loss (i.e., a loss with reduced 
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expectancy and low proximity), this combination of in-
creased expectancy and high proximity may simultaneously 
frustrate gamblers so that they are motivated to avoid the 
source of discomfort, while at the same time provide an in-
centive to continue as they may perceive themselves getting 
closer to a win. Together, these two factors may lead to the 
quick initiation of a new gamble after AAB (i.e., for startRT, 
AAB  ABC) and the perpetuation of gambling in the long 
run. 
More broadly, our results suggest that it may be fruitful 
to explicitly distinguish the dimension of proximity and 
expectancy in future research on ‘near misses’. Some re-
searchers have acknowledged that ‘near misses’ may not 
be an unitary phenomenon (Clark et al., 2009, 2013), and 
some have distinguished between ‘classic’ (such as AAB) 
and ‘non-classic’ near misses (such as ABB and ABA) in 
their research (M. J. Dixon et al., 2013; Worhunsky et al., 
2014). However, such a dichotimazation (classic vs. non-
classic) is not based on any purported difference in the un-
derlying mechanisms, and is therefore not theoretically in-
formative. We propose using the separate dimensions of 
proximity and expectancy to define and operationalize dif-
ferent types of ‘near misses’. This may help reconcile in-
consistencies in previous findings due to their different op-
erationalizations, and help us better understand how ‘near 
misses’ contribute to gambling persistence. 
Conclusion 
Endeavors to obtain rewards are not always successful. 
In the present research, we explored how reward omission 
would influence response vigor in a gambling context, as a 
function of the changes in winning expectancy as a game 
evolves, and the proximity of the eventual loss to a win. We 
observed that overall, people increased response vigor after 
a loss than a win. Moreover, a proximal loss decreased the 
vigor (i.e., speed) of ensuing responses compared to a distal 
loss, while a loss after increased winning expectancy may 
increase response vigor compared to after reduced winning 
expectancy. These adjustments may be triggered by the ap-
praised discrepancy between the current state and a refer-
ence state, and serve to close the perceived gap and facil-
itate goal pursuit. In gambling contexts where the contin-
ued pursuit of rewards after omission may be harmful, these 
processes may contribute to maladaptive goal pursuit in the 
form of excessive gambling. Further exploring the adjust-
ment of response vigor after reward omission may help us 
better understand the adaptive goal pursuit process, and al-
so how it becomes maladaptive in certain situations. 
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Table 11: Effects of Win Probability in Experiment 3 
Stage Outcome Comparison diff lowerCI upperCI t p w 
Card3 
AA 
High vs. Medium -56 -95 -17 -2.89 0.019 0.029 5.52 0.165 
High vs. Low -101 -149 -53 -4.19  < .001  < .001 0.274 
Medium vs. Low -45 -85 -5 -2.23 0.085 0.190 1.20 0.118 
AB 
High vs. Medium 16 -4 37 1.62 0.192 0.190 0.402 0.061 
High vs. Low 31 11 52 3.05 0.015 0.048 8.43 0.121 
Medium vs. Low 15 -3 33 1.68 0.192 0.158 0.441 0.059 
Confirm 
AAA 
High vs. Medium -58 -102 -14 -2.62 0.113 0.284 2.87 0.112 
High vs. Low -121 -184 -58 -3.82 0.003 0.037 83.58 0.215 
Medium vs. Low -63 -132 5 -1.84 0.553 1.000 0.573 0.108 
AAB 
High vs. Medium -8 -47 31 -0.40 1.000 1.000 0.123 0.027 
High vs. Low -9 -54 36 -0.41 1.000 1.000 0.124 0.030 
Medium vs. Low -2 -40 37 -0.08 1.000 1.000 0.114 0.006 
ABB 
High vs. Medium 21 -16 59 1.12 1.000 1.000 0.208 0.074 
High vs. Low 24 -21 68 1.05 1.000 1.000 0.195 0.080 
Medium vs. Low 2 -36 41 0.12 1.000 1.000 0.115 0.008 
ABC 
High vs. Medium 50 5 95 2.21 0.265 0.937 1.16 0.194 
High vs. Low 48 7 88 2.35 0.208 0.284 1.55 0.182 
Medium vs. Low -2 -33 29 -0.14 1.000 1.000 0.115 0.010 
Start 
AAA 
High vs. Medium -5 -42 32 -0.27 1.000 1.000 0.118 0.015 
High vs. Low -18 -63 27 -0.80 1.000 1.000 0.156 0.053 
Medium vs. Low -13 -57 30 -0.60 1.000 1.000 0.136 0.039 
AAB 
High vs. Medium -12 -42 19 -0.77 1.000 1.000 0.152 0.048 
High vs. Low -20 -47 7 -1.44 1.000 0.941 0.311 0.078 
Medium vs. Low -8 -37 22 -0.53 1.000 1.000 0.131 0.033 
ABB 
High vs. Medium 14 -21 48 0.78 1.000 1.000 0.153 0.051 
High vs. Low 10 -25 45 0.56 1.000 1.000 0.133 0.038 
Medium vs. Low -4 -37 30 -0.21 1.000 1.000 0.117 0.014 
ABC 
High vs. Medium -27 -70 16 -1.25 1.000 0.599 0.243 0.096 
High vs. Low 6 -30 41 0.31 1.000 1.000 0.119 0.021 
Medium vs. Low 33 4 61 2.27 0.303 0.599 1.32 0.127 
Note. diff = difference in response time (RT) between high-amount and low-amount condition, in milliseconds (positive value indicates longer RT in the high-amount condition); lowerCI = lower limit of 95% confidence interval; upperCI = upper limit of 95% confidence interval;  =  value 
from paired-sample t test;  =  value from paired-sample t test;  =  value from Wilcoxon signed-rank test;  and  are corrected for multiple comparisons within each stage using the Holm-Bonferroni method.  = Bayes factor, the likelihood of obtaining the current data under the 
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Figure A1: RT across all stages in Experiment 1. Error bars stand for 95% within-subject confidence intervals. 
Appendix 
RTs in all stages 
Here we provide an overview of the descriptives of RTs 
across different stages of one episode (from starting the 
current game to turning the second card of the next game), 
as a function of the outcome of the current game, and the 
amount of points (Experiments 1 and 2; Figure A1 and Fig-
ure A2, respectively) or the probability of winning of the 
current game (Experiment 3; Figure A3). Note that startRT 
of the current game, and the RT of turning the first and sec-
ond card of the current game were not expected to be in-
fluenced by the outcome, as the outcome of each game on-
ly became partially revealed after turning the second card. 
The first three RTs indeed did not vary as a function of game 
outcome. The differences between wins and losses persist-
ed till when participants turned the second card of the next 
game in all three experiments (Card 2 (Next Trial) in the fig-
ures). 
Sequential analysis on confirm RT in Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2, we first collected data from 100 par-
ticipants, and then added another 49 participants. Note for 
the sequential analyses, participants with insufficient num-
ber of trials were excluded (see the Data Analysis section of 
the main text). When using ABB as the high-proximity, re-
duced-expectancy condition as in Experiment 1, s al-
ready showed strong support for the effects of both ex-
pectancy (AAB vs. ABB) and proximity (ABB vs. ABC) with 
100 participants (Figure A4). When using ABA as the high-
proximity, reduced-expectancy condition, s showed 
anecdotal support for the effects of expectancy (AAB vs. 
ABA) and proximity (ABA vs. ABC) with 100 participants. 
Adding another 49 participants increased the magnitudes of 
s to very strong evidence for both effects (Figure A5). 
Lastly, the direct comparison between ABB and ABA showed 
moderate to strong support for the null hypothesis with da-
ta from 100 participants, and the magnitude of  re-
mained stable after adding another 49 participants (Figure 
A6). 
Meta-analyses of the comparisons between different 
outcomes in confirm RT and start RT 
The RT of confirming the outcome of the current game 
(i.e., confirm RT) and the RT of starting the next game (i.e., 
start RT) from all three experiments were used in the cur-
rent meta-analyses. For the RT data from Experiment 2, the 
outcomes ABB and ABA were combined into ABB; the out-
comes AAB and AAC were combined into AAB. Each ex-
periment thus contained 4 outcomes, namely AAA, AAB, 
ABB and ABC, resulting in 6 unique pairs in total. Different 
amount levels in Experiments 1 and 2, and different overall 
winning probabilities in Experiment 3, were combined for 
the current analysis. 
For each comparison, we calculated the difference in RT 
between two outcomes. The mean and the standard devi-
ation of the RT differences were then calculated for each 
experiment, and submitted to a meta-analysis by using the 
metamean function from the meta package (Balduzzi et al., 
2019, p. version 4.12-0). The inverse variance method was 
used to pool the effect sizes (raw mean differences), and re-
sults from the random-effects model were reported. Since 
each stage included 6 comparisons,  values were corrected 
for multiple comparisons by using the Holm-Bonferroni 
method for each stage separately. 
As can be seen from Table A1, for confirm RT, partici-
pants confirmed ABB more slowly than ABC (slowing effect 
of high proximity) and confirmed AAB more quickly than 
ABB (potential invigoration effect of increased expectancy), 
while no significant difference was observed between AAB 
and ABC. For start RT, however, the overall pattern of re-
sults changed: participants started a new game more quick-
ly after AAB than after ABB and ABC, while no significant 
difference between ABB and ABC was observed. Overall, 
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Table A1: Meta-Analyses of the Comparisons Between Outcomes in Confirm RT and Start RT 
Stage Comparison diff lowerCI upperCI p 
Confirm 
AAA vs. AAB 332 236 428  < .001 
AAA vs. ABB 280 192 368  < .001 
AAA vs. ABC 342 246 437  < .001 
AAB vs. ABB -54 -70 -37  < .001 
AAB vs. ABC 8 -8 24 0.305 
ABB vs. ABC 62 45 78  < .001 
Start 
AAA vs. AAB 163 134 191  < .001 
AAA vs. ABB 141 121 161  < .001 
AAA vs. ABC 133 110 157  < .001 
AAB vs. ABB -21 -39 -3 0.043 
AAB vs. ABC -29 -42 -16  < .001 
ABB vs. ABC -7 -17 2 0.140 
Note. diff = difference in response time (RT), in milliseconds; lowerCI = lower limit of 95% confidence interval; upperCI = upper limit of 95% confidence interval.  values are corrected 
for multiple comparison for each stage using the Holm-Bonferroni method. 
Figure A2: RT across all stages in Experiment 2. Error bars stand for 95% within-subject confidence intervals. 
these results might show that the opposing effects of ex-
pectancy and proximity canceled each other out on the con-
firm RT for AAB trials, but the invigoration effect of in-
creased expectancy is more durable that the slowing effect 
of high proximity, resulting in faster start RT after AAB 
compared to ABB and ABC. 
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Figure A3: RT across all stages in Experiment 3. Error bars stand for 95% within-subject confidence intervals. 
Figure A4: Sequential analysis of the comparison between ABB and ABA in Experiment 2. ABB is used as the high-
proximity, low-expectancy condition. 
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Figure A5: Sequential analysis of the effects of expectancy and proximity in Experiment 2. ABA is used as the high-
proximity, low-expectancy condition. 
Figure A6: Sequential analysis of the comparison between ABB and ABA in Experiment 2. 
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